bilateral tax treaties. That is, how a bilateral treaty may have a third-country effect of distorting or diverting investment flows or how networks of bilateral treaties create complexities which make it difficult to determine where tax credits should be applied.
Because tax treaties differ across country pairs, managers of multinational firms can practice "treaty shopping," and invest in a third country that offers a lower withholding rate to the host country. Hence, third country effects are magnified by the transfer pricing opportunities available to multinationals that operate in many countries.
Because of their opposing effects, the net effect of bilateral tax treaties on FDI is an empirical issue. In general, the existing and limited empirical literature finds little or no evidence that the signing of a bilateral tax treaty spurs new FDI, or weak evidence in support of a negative impact. In this study we use aggregate U.S. FDI outflows, but disaggregate the flow data into its three financing modes: equity capital, retained earnings, and inter-company debt. We view our contribution to the literature in three ways.
First, we examine how tax treaties might affect the different modes of financing in addition to aggregate flows. Second, we accommodate the distribution of the data by employing quantile regressions models as suggested by Millimet and Kumas (2007) .
We, however, use fixed-effects quantile-regression models to account for potential country-pair fixed effects, while including separate controls for new treaty countries (negotiated within the sample period), existing and renegotiated treaty countries, and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 no treaty countries rather than pooling any two groups or dropping a group. Third we consider potential multilateral effects by including a control for the total number of treaties a host country has in place during a given year. Our models also allow us to consider the tax holiday included in the 2005 American Jobs Creation Act. These last two issues, to our knowledge, have not yet been considered in the empirical literature.
In addition, we take advantage of new and expanded data that includes not only a longer time span than the data employed in earlier studies of tax treaties, but also a larger number of countries with new or in-sample treaties or with no treaty.
Our empirical results indicate that the total number of tax treaties a host country has in place has a statistically significant and positive impact on total U.S. FDI outflows and all three financing modes. In contrast, total FDI outflows, equity-financed FDI outflows, and retained earnings show a negative and statistically significant association with new and existing-renegotiated tax treaties. Further results for existing-renegotiated treaties point to a positive and statistically significant impact on inter-company debt while new treaties show a positive but statistically insignificant impact.
We offer as an explanation that, on the one hand, the positive multilateral effect measured by the total number of treaties is consistent with a treaty-shopping effect in which a host country with a large number of bilateral treaties facilitates income shifting by multinational firms for tax minimization purposes. On the other hand, new and renegotiated U.S. bilateral tax treaties enhance tax cooperation, information sharing, 4 and rules to reduce tax avoidance and outweigh positive aspects of the treaties thereby reducing both equity-financed FDI and reinvested earnings. Indeed Dagan (2000) argues that tax treaties are not even needed to eliminate double-taxation and are really used to simplify and coordinate taxation and redistribute tax revenues from developing to developed nations. Hence, our results are consistent with Davies observation that there exists a "mismatch" between the framing of tax treaties and how they are used in practice.
Results for a 2004 time control shows statistically significant results that are consistent with an anticipated policy (tax holiday) effect in which retained earnings were larger for that year, all other things considered. Results for the 2005 time controls display statistically significant results consistent with an actual policy effect in that earnings retained abroad we lower in 2005. As one would expect, these statistically significant positive-negative effects are also reflected in total FDI outflows but not in equity-financed FDI or intercompany debt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the literature on taxes and FDI and tax treaties and FDI. Section 3 describes the pattern of U.S. FDI flows, modes of financing FDI, and our research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 5 provides the results of the empirical models while Section 6 offers a conclusion .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 2.
Tax Treaties, and Foreign Direct Investment
Tax treaties, FDI, and Financing Modes
Reuven (2009) provides an excellent history and overview of the design and implementation of bilateral tax treaties, while Davies (2004) offers a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on tax treaties, in particular contrasting the conventional view that tax treaties are designed to increase FDI with the empirical evidence in the literature that shows otherwise. He points out that tax treaties may increase FDI through several different channels: elimination of double taxation through credits or exemptions, tax coordination, coordination of tax definitions and jurisdiction, which reduce tax uncertainty. However, tax treaties are also designed to promote information sharing between policymakers in the host and source country and setting standards for transfer pricing policies thereby reducing tax evasion and treaty shopping and may actually reduce FDI. Blonigen and Davies (2000) offer the first empirical study of the impact of tax treaties on FDI. Focusing on U.S. FDI inflows and outflows, a dummy variable for a bilateral tax treaty implied a strong positive and significant effect, leading to the conclusion that tax treaties promote FDI. The authors note that the effects of a treaty may change over time and so they include an age or "vintage" variable reflecting the length of time the treaty has been in place. This variable was positive and significant, leading them to conclude that tax treaties have a positive impact on FDI that increases 6 over time. Blonigen and Davies (2004) , take issue with two aspects of their earlier study.
First, the earlier analysis used a single dummy variable for tax treaties. Some countries in the sample had treaties existing prior to the sample period whiles others did not.
Those with existing treaties tend to be the largest recipients of U.S. FDI flows and the largest source countries for FDI into the United States. Hence, the dummy variable may actually be reflecting differences of unobserved country characteristics between existing-treaty countries and new-treaty countries. Second, when FDI is measured in levels, new treaties were found to be significant and positive, while when measured in logs, they were not. The authors argue that because logging the dependent variable helps with the inherent skewness of the data, the analysis should be completed in log form. Blonigen and Davies (2005) uses a similar approach but considers FDI flows of a group of OECD countries from 1982 through 1992. Using a single dummy variable for tax treaties they once again find a positive and significant effect on FDI stocks.
However, when separating old and new treaties, they find a positive and significant effect for old treaties but a negative and significant effect for new treaties when the dependent variable is in levels and for new treaties a negative but insignificant effect when the dependent variable is in logs. Davies (2004, p. 784) offers possible explanations for the lack of a consistent 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 significant effect of treaty variable in their empirical studies: FDI may be affected by factors other than government tax policies and the data may be too "noisy to tease out the positive effect of tax treaties" or that the way treaties are used in practice may be different than their potential as agued by theorists.
Davies (2003) and controlling for the potential endogeneity they find a significant negative effect for new treaties.
Following this, Barthel et al. (2009) use a large data set of bilateral FDI relationships to consider the impact of tax treaties on FDI stocks. Their estimates result from a fixed-effects model which, as explained above, eliminates the control for existing treaties. Again the benefit of this approach is that it eliminates the potential endogeniety of the existing treaties variable with the latent country-specific characteristics. The remaining tax treaty dummy variable then captures treaties negotiated during the sample period. Using stock data, they also include a variable for the age of the treaty to capture the impact of the treaty over time. Both variables are positive and significant with the treaty-age effect only "slightly higher" than the new-treaty effect. The authors attribute the positive and robust results to a larger sample of countries and longer time period.
Most recently, Blonigen et al. (2012) and Davies et al. (2009) use firm-level data to   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 explore the opposing effects tax treaties have on the intensive margin (the level of FDI flows as measured by affiliate sales) and extensive margin (the probability of new investment). Davies et al. find that the implementation of a new tax treaty has no effect on the level of FDI but does have a positive impact on the probability of investment. claims on earnings are repatriated to the parent. Because each of these flows contain both positive and negative outflows, the net outflow can be positive, negative, or zero in any given period.
Managers of MNEs, therefore, can rely on any or all of the three financing modes as options for financing FDI. Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998) show a similar pecking order in the data in that reinvested earnings are the most important source of financing for U.S. MNEs operating abroad. They show this to be the case both at country or region levels and industry levels. Furthermore, they find that reinvested earnings are more important regionally than globally both in aggregate and at industry levels. However, they also point out that although equity financing is less important as a source of financing for U.S. MNEs operating abroad than is reinvested earnings, it is more important than inter-company debt.
The data used in the analysis here is from the same source as Daniels et al., but is extended to include a larger number of countries and a longer time period. show that though reinvested earnings are more important than equity finance, equity is more important than inter-company debt. With an understanding of the existing literature and the pattern of data, we next offer our research hypotheses.
Figures 1 through 3 Here

The American Jobs Creation Act
Though the 2004 AJCA initially began as a bill to compensate exporters for the repeal of the tax-based export subsidy, it quickly grew to include many tax breaks. One provision was a tax break or tax holiday offered to corporations for repatriation of foreign-earned income. In this provision, for the year 2005 only, U.S. multinationals paid a 5.25 percent tax rate on foreign source income (the statutory U.S. corporate tax rate was and is 35 percent). In order to receive this credit, firms were required to submit a proposal on how the repatriated earnings would be used to undertake specific domestic investment projects. Hence, this tax holiday was enacted to incentivize firms to permanently reinvest income earned abroad domestically in effort to promote job growth. Because 2004 was an election year, the bill was trumpeted throughout the year and so was anticipated early in the year, before eventually being signed by both the house and senate in October.
As a result, the approach used here is to view the act as both an anticipated policy action and an actual policy action. We expect that because the policy was 
New Tax Treaties
If, on the one hand, tax treaties promote FDI, then we should expect their effect on total flows and the three components of financing to be positive. It is unclear, a priori, which mode would be most elastic to the policy change and which the least elastic. If, on the other hand, treaties primarily serve to coordinate tax policy, set rules for transfer pricing and reduce tax evasion and treaty shopping, then they could well reduce FDI.
Though this might reduce the transfer of new funds and be reflected in a decline in equity financing, we expect the biggest impact on retained earnings and debt as it would affect income shifting described in the review of the tax studies above.
Given the work cited above, one should treat those countries with treaties existing prior to the sample period separately from those countries that negotiated a treaty during the sample period. The majority of the countries with new treaties are emerging or developing countries. Those with existing treaties are developed economies and all of the treaties were negotiated prior to 1957. Hence, because of differing country characteristics, the net effect of the dual objectives in the tax treaties may not necessarily have a similar impact on FDI flows to the two groups of countries.
Because reinvested earnings are the most important financing mode for U.S. multinationals, we expect their biggest impact to be on the reinvested earnings of U.S. multinationals and be reflected in overall flows as well. In short, the impact of old and new treaties is an empirical question likely to be reflected in retained earnings flows. 
Existing-Renegotiated Treaties
In our sample there are 22 countries with treaties in place prior to 1982, 15 with treaties completed during the sample period, 1982 through 2008, and 16 countries with no treaty in place. There are 17 of the 22 countries with existing treaties who renegotiated the tax treaty. Some treaties were renegotiated prior to the start of our sample period and some after (4 prior to 1982 and the remainder after 1982). Table 1 provides a list of all the countries in the study, the date the tax treaty came into force, and the date of a renegotiation of the treaty.
The renegotiated treaties updated the old treaties in a number of different ways.
The most important were conditions to reduce treaty shopping and revisions on the treatment of branch profits versus subsidiary profits in line with the 1986 U.S. tax revision. In addition, for some of these countries the withholding rates and dividends on direct investment changed.
The renegotiated treaties also had an impact on the taxation of dividends of direct investment in countries including Switzerland, Ireland, and Italy. Most countries tax dividends on direct investment at a lower rate (typically 5 percent) than dividends on portfolio investment (typically 15 percent). However, the definition of direct versus portfolio investment can vary across countries. In these three countries there had to be a 95 percent ownership share to be considered direct investment. The renegotiation reduced that threshold to the standard 10 percent threshold in both Switzerland and   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Ireland. For Italy, it was reduced from 95 percent to 50 percent to qualify for the 5 percent tax rate, and between 10 percent and 50 percent for a 10 percent tax rate.
Therefore, as with new treaties, the net effect of the renegotiation of existing treaties is an empirical question. Our approach to coding the existing-renegotiated treaties is described in the next section.
Of course, managers of firms face a number of different choices beyond the foreign entry modes of exporting or FDI. Indeed the 2011 UNCTAD World Investment
Report focuses on the growing importance of non-equity modes (NEM) of international production. UNCTAD defines NEM as alternatives to taking ownership share of a foreign entity, such as franchising, licensing, outsourcing, and so on. Though our focus is how tax treaties and tax holidays might affect U.S. FDI outflows and the financing of those flows, we do not intend to minimize the importance of other global strategies. In the next section, we describe both our empirical approach and the data in much more detail.
Data and Empirical Methodology
To explore the role of tax treaties and the tax holiday of the 2004 AJCA, we employ a standard model that includes explanatory variables suggested by the existing literature on FDI (see Bonigen 2005 in particular). Our empirical analysis considers aggregate or total U.S. FDI outflows and outflows separated into their three financing modes. Independent variables also include the lag of real GDP, the log of the host country's population, trade openness expressed as the total of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, financial openness measured by capital inflows as a percentage of GDP, and domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP which serves as a measure of the financial depth of the host economy. Size similarity is measured following Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) using GDP data. The log of the sum of phone (land-line) subscriptions and mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people is used to capture information capabilities of the host economy. All of these variables are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
All models also include the log of the real exchange rate between the dollar and the currency of the host country (expressed as U.S. dollar/host currency so that an The key independent variables of our analysis include a dummy variable for new (enacted during the sample period) tax treaties coded with the value of 1 when a treaty is in place and 0 otherwise. To code the existing-renegotiated treaties (existing prior to the sample period) we follow Allee and Peinhardt's (2010) treatment of investment treaties in an empirical model. Hence, existing treaties are assigned a value of 1 and when renegotiated a value of 2 thereby creating a control that varies over time. This approach is consistent with the fact that the existing treaties are improved and updated rather than replaced. Using these two variables for new and old-renegotiated treaties, 3 It would be preferred to also include effective tax rates but they are not available for the broad set of countries in this study. The statutory tax rates were kindly provided by the Center for Global and Economic Studies and PricewaterHouseCoopers and are available from the authors by email .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 leaving "no treaty" as the omitted category, we are able to distinguish between various groups of countries and their treaty status. Note that previous studies either pooled the different groups or only considered new treaty countries. Treaty information can be found in Table 1 and is derived from information available on the website of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service.
A count variable is used to code the number of treaties that a host country has in place in any given year and is derived from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database on country-specific double-taxation treaties.
Finally, given that we are exploring panel data, all models include year controls. In order to consider the impact of the AJCA, we consider the controls specific to 2004 and 2005. Table 2 provides summary statistics for all variables prior to their transformation.
Empirical Model: The Problem of Negative FDI Flows
As described earlier, the four FDI flow measures are net flows of capital, which can assume either a positive or negative value. To understand how a FDI outflow measure can be either positive or negative first consider an equity capital increase which reflects an additional capital contribution to an existing affiliate, an acquisition of an existing entity, or the establishment of a new affiliate. Second, decreases in equity capital also occur when a U.S. parent partially or fully liquidates or sells a previously established affiliate, or simply returns or borrows capital from an affiliate, all of which can be referred to as capital repatriation. Typically aggregate total outward investment flows are positive for a given year.
However, for a specific country during a given year, a decrease in equity capital position can exceed an increase in equity capital position resulting in a negative net value. In 2006, for example, the total U.S. outward direct investment flow was positive.
However, for Canada in specific, capital decreases or capital repatriation exceeded capital increases resulting in a negative flow value.
These negative values create a problem as the variable of interest cannot be Others treat the negative observations as missing or set at zero and employ a truncated-data approach, such as a Tobit model (see for example Razin and Sadka, 2007 Alternative transformations -such as the neglog transformation suggested by Whittaker, Whitehead, and Somers (2005) which do treat negative and positive values symmetrically -when applied to FDI data that is peaked near zero and has long tails, results in a bimodal distribution and require nonparametric approaches.
Because these approaches are less than satisfactory, some researchers avoid using flow data and opt for stock data. Of course this approach is fine, but one would expect stocks to react rather slowly to some variables, such as changes in transportation costs, making it difficult to flesh out the impact of these variables on FDI. For some studies, 4 The extent of the bias is proportional to the share of the sample that is screened or truncated. See Greene(2003) for an explanation and Coe et al. (2007) for a discussion relating to trade data .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 like the one here, stock data is not available for some measures (such as the various financing modes) and so this last approach is not an option.
As mentioned above, kurtosis is another problem with FDI data but is not often discussed in the literature on FDI flows. The prevalence of extreme values in total flows and the disaggregated flows leads to a peaked distribution with very long tails (common in financial data). Hence, a mean estimation approach on the level of flows is not likely to be robust to these extreme values and results may be misleading.
Our empirical strategy is to take a nonparametric approach and use a quantile They find that the effects of new treaties are not homogeneous over the distribution and argue (p. 11) that "…the distinction between levels and logs appears to be primarily and artifact of the focus on the (condition) mean effect of tax treaties."
Though novel in the FDI literature, the approach of Millimet and Kumas has a shortcoming as pointed out by Egger et al. (2006) in that treaty implementation may be a "self-selection" event. This means that the treaty variable may be correlated with the latent country-specific characteristic which, in this application, is the unobserved propensity of U.S. firms to FDI to a given country. This problem would require a fixedeffects model approach. Indeed a Hausman test on standard random-effects models 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 versus fixed-effects models which include all variables described above for total and disaggregated flows reject a random effects model. Therefore, we settle on a pooledquantile regression model with fixed-effects by following Canay (2011) and Wooldridge (2010) using bootstrapped errors to compare results across the conditional quantiles. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 outflows for U.S. firms and so the outcome for reinvested earnings is reflected in total flows.
The models for equity capital show some differential results from those for total flows. Real GDP is negative and statistically significant. The corporate tax rate is negative and statistically significant for the middle quantiles. Trade openness is significant only for the top quantiles and NAFTA is not statistically significant.
The models for intercompany debt provide the most heterogeneous results. Real FDI stocks, size similarity, credit, and the real exchange rate are all statistically significant and of the opposite sign as the results for total flows and reinvested earnings. Trade agreement is positive and statistically significant across the entire distribution of data.
Results for New, Old-Renegotiated, and Total Number of Treaties
Figures 4 through 7 illustrate the estimated treaty effects across total FDI flows and the three financing modes. Results for the new treaty control show a negative and statistically significant relationship with total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital. Evaluated at the median to quantify this effect, a new tax treaty reduces U.S.
FDI outflows to the host country by approximately $7 million. As shown in Figure 4 , the negative impact of a new treaty is increasing across the distribution of total flows. A similar pattern for reinvested earnings and equity capital is evident in Figures 5 and 6 .
The new treaty control is not statistically significant in the inter-company debt model. The old-renegotiated treaty control is also negative and statistically significant in the models for total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital. (Note in Table 5 , the estimated coefficient in the fixed-effects mean regression has a p-value of 0.055.) A pattern where the variable is significant for all but the largest quantile is consistent across all three of these flows. As displayed in Figures 4 through 6 , in general the negative impact of old-renegotiated treaties is diminishing across the distribution of these flows. In contrast, the impact of an old-renegotiated treaty on inter-company debt is positive and statistically significant with the estimated effect increasing across the distribution of debt flows as shown in Figure 7 .
Evaluated at the median, an old-renegotiated treaty reduces U.S. FDI outflows to the host country by approximately $3 million. This rather modest effect is due to the differential impact across the three financing modes. Viewing Tables 5 through 7 and again evaluating at the median, an old-renegotiated treaty has a relative small negative effect on reinvested earnings, a large negative effect on equity capital and a relatively large positive impact on inter-company debt.
The count variable for total number of tax treaties in place in the host country is positive and statistically significant across the entire distribution of total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital. Though the control is positive for intercompany debt, it is significant only around the median value. Figures 4 through 6 show that the impact of the total number of treaties is increasing across the distribution of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 these three flows. Evaluated at the median, the economic significance is rather modest at approximately $0.4 million for total FDI flows, $0.3 for reinvested earnings, and $1.1 million for equity capital. It is important to note, however, that these estimates reflect the impact of the host country increasing the total number of tax treaties it has with other countries on just U.S. FDI flows to the host. In aggregate (or considering beyond U.S. flows alone) this effect could be quite substantial.
What we take from this is that tax cooperation, information sharing, and 
Results for 2004 and 2005 Controls
We consider the estimated coefficients on the 2004 and 2005 year controls to evaluate 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 the potential for an anticipated and actual policy effect form the passage of the AJCA.
Of course the sign and magnitude of these coefficients and the model constant is dependent on the selection of the omitted year, which by default we leave at 1982.
Therefore we gauge the effect by viewing the significance and magnitude relative to the other year controls.
The 2004 control is statistically significant in the models for total FDI flows and reinvested earnings. In both models it is the largest value among all the year controls. It is neither significant nor the largest value for equity capital and inter-company debt.
The 2005 control is statistically significant in the models for total FDI flows and reinvested earnings. In both models it is the largest negative value among all the year controls and statistically significantly different from the next largest negative value. It is neither significant nor the largest negative value for equity capital and inter-company debt.
These results are consistent with an anticipated policy effect increasing the net retained earnings of U.S. multinationals in 2004 and an actual policy effect of reducing net retained earnings in 2005. Because retained earnings are the most important mode of FDI outflows for U.S. multinationals, the impact on retained earnings is also reflected in total flows.
Robustness Test
The results for reinvested earnings, equity capital, and inter-company debt are based on 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 individual regression equations. Of course managers of multinational firms and select among these different modes of financing or combine these modes. Hence, the three types of flows, in aggregate net flows may not be independent. For each type of flow we use the fixed-effects (within) estimator on the models (which do not include timeinvariant variables), with a full set of period controls and standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, to obtain estimates of the unit-specific residuals.
These residuals are then incorporated into each equation to estimate a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). These results are then compared and contrasted with the estimates of the fixed-effects mean regressions provided in Tables 5 through 7 For old-renegotiated treaties and the total number of treaties we find that the absolute value of the estimated coefficients for equity capital are statistically significantly larger 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 than for reinvested earnings.
Conclusion
The origins of current bilateral tax treaties can be traced back to the League of Nations and continue to be negotiated today. With over 2,500 such treaties in place, they form the basis for the legal framework governing international investment flows. By their nature, these treaties have two primary objectives; the avoidance of double taxation, and the prevention of tax evasion and fraud. Though typically promoted as a policy to spur new FDI flows, the dual nature of bilateral tax treaties may provide incentives for multinationals to increase or decrease FDI activity.
In general, empirical studies do not provide robust conclusions for old treaties, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 therefore, may not be evident in aggregated flows.
Regression results indicate that anticipation of the passage of the American Jobs
Creation Act led to an increase in outflows of reinvested earnings while the tax break it offered in 2005 lead to a decrease. Results for tax treaties indicate that new treaties have a negative and statistically significant impact on total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital but are not significant for inter-company debt. Old-renegotiated treaties have a negative impact on total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital and a positive impact on inter-company debt. The total number of treaties a host country has in place has a positive and statistically significant impact on total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital but not for inter-company debt. We offer as a possible explanation that tax avoidance is the most important contribution of new treaties while reduced withholdings and reductions in taxes on direct investment dividends are the most important contributions of new treaties.
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